Keeping track of the Gettier problem

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):127-152 (2011)
Abstract
This paper argues that for someone to know proposition p inferentially it is not enough that his belief in p and his justification for believing p covary with the truth of p through a sphere of possibilities. A further condition on inferential knowledge is that p's truth-maker is identical with, or causally related to, the state of affairs the justification is grounded in. This position is dubbed ‘identificationism.’
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01389.x
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Epistemic Entitlement and Luck.Sandy Goldberg - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):273-302.
Prospects for Epistemic Compatibilism.Sven Bernecker - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 130 (1):81-104.

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