Informal Logic 28 (4):315-334 (2008)
AbstractI defend a conception of Logic as normative for the sort of activities in which inferences super-vene, namely, reasoning and arguing. Toulmin’s criticism of formal logic will be our framework to shape the idea that in order to make sense of Logic as normative, we should con-ceive it as a discipline devoted to the layout of arguments, understood as the representations of the semantic, truth relevant, properties of the inferences that we make in arguing and reason-ing
Similar books and articles
The Relation Between Formal and Informal Logic.Ralph H. Johnson - 1999 - Argumentation 13 (3):265-274.
Formalizing the Logic of Historical Inference: Contact Details. [REVIEW]D. L. D'Avray & Antonia Fitzpatrick - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):833-844.
Evaluating Inferences: The Nature and Role of Warrants.Robert C. Pinto - 2006 - Informal Logic 26 (3):287-317.
Managing Informal Mathematical Knowledge: Techniques From Informal Logic.Andrew Aberdein - 2006 - Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 4108:208--221.
The Inconspicuous Role of Paraphrase.David Sherry - 1991 - History and Philosophy of Logic 12 (2):151-166.
Handbook of the Logic of Argument and Inference: The Turn Towards the Practical.Dov M. Gabbay (ed.) - 2002 - Elsevier.
What Does It Mean to Say That Logic is Formal?John MacFarlane - 2000 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Deduction Without Dogmas:The Case of Moral Analogical Argumentation.Lilian Bermejo-Luque - 2014 - Informal Logic 34 (3):311-336.
Second Order Intersubjectivity: The Dialectical Dimension of Argumentation.Lilian Bermejo-Luque - 2010 - Argumentation 24 (1):85-105.
Argumentation Theory and the Conception of Epistemic Justification.Lilian Bermejo-Luque - 2009 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 16 (29).
References found in this work
Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment.Robert Brandom - 1994 - Harvard University Press.
Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism.Robert Brandom - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):123-125.