Logic as (Normative) Inference Theory: Formal vs. Non-formal Theories of Inference Goodness

Informal Logic 28 (4):315-334 (2008)
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Abstract

I defend a conception of Logic as normative for the sort of activities in which inferences super-vene, namely, reasoning and arguing. Toulmin’s criticism of formal logic will be our framework to shape the idea that in order to make sense of Logic as normative, we should con-ceive it as a discipline devoted to the layout of arguments, understood as the representations of the semantic, truth relevant, properties of the inferences that we make in arguing and reason-ing

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Lilian Bermejo Luque
University of Granada