Moral Judgment, Action and Emotion

Philosophy 59 (229):295 - 321 (1984)
What makes us responsive, however occasionally, to moral demands? Why do people sometimes own up, go off to fight unwillingly in what they consider to be just wars, refrain from stealing a march on friends, and so on, even when they could by doing otherwise reap advantages far outweighing, in the scales of ordinary prudential rationality, any consequent disadvantage? Why has morality such a hold over us?
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Ben Spiecker (1990). Forms of Trust in Education and Development. Studies in Philosophy and Education 10 (2):157-164.

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