Modal meinongianism and fiction: The best of three worlds

Philosophical Studies 152 (3):313-35 (2011)
Abstract
We outline a neo-Meinongian framework labeled as Modal Meinongian Metaphysics (MMM) to account for the ontology and semantics of fictional discourse. Several competing accounts of fictional objects are originated by the fact that our talking of them mirrors incoherent intuitions: mainstream theories of fiction privilege some such intuitions, but are forced to account for others via complicated paraphrases of the relevant sentences. An ideal theory should resort to as few paraphrases as possible. In Sect. 1, we make this explicit via two methodological principles, called the Minimal Revision and the Acceptability Constraint. In Sect. 2, we introduce the standard distinction between internal and external fictional discourse. In Sects. 3–5, we discuss the approaches of (traditional) Meinongianism, Fictionalism, and Realism—and their main troubles. In Sect. 6 we propose our MMM approach. This is based upon (1) a modal semantics including impossible worlds (Subsect. 6.1); (2) a qualified Comprehension Principle for objects (Subsect. 6.2); (3) a notion of existence-entailment for properties (Subsect. 6.3). In Sect. 7 we present a formal semantics for MMM based upon a representation operator. And in Sect. 8 we have a look at how MMM solves the problems of the three aforementioned theories.
Keywords Fictional objects  Meinongianism  Modal Meinongianism  Fictionalism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2012
DOI 10.1007/s11098-009-9479-2
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
References found in this work BETA
On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 2005 - Mind 114 (456):873 - 887.
Nonexistence.Nathan Salmon - 1998 - Noûs 32 (3):277-319.
Truth in Fiction.David Lewis - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1):37--46.

View all 31 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Noneism, Ontology, and Fundamentality.Tatjana von Solodkoff & Richard Woodward - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):558-583.
On Modal Meinongianism.Thibaut Giraud - 2016 - Synthese 193 (10).
Frivolous Fictions.David Sanson - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (2):1-20.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-11-28

Total downloads
618 ( #2,329 of 2,193,594 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
46 ( #3,073 of 2,193,594 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature