Modal Meinongianism and Object Theory: A Reply to Bueno and Zalta

Australasian Journal of Logic 17 (1):1 (2020)
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Abstract

We reply to various arguments by Otavio Bueno and Edward Zalta against Modal Meinongianism, including that it presupposes, but cannot maintain, a unique denotation for names of fictional characters, and that it is not generalizable to higher-order objects. We individuate the crucial difference between Modal Meinongianism and Object Theory in the former’s resorting to an apparatus of worlds, possible and impossible, for the representational purposes for which the latter resorts to a distinction between two kinds of predication, exemplification and encoding. We show that encoding has fewer forerunners in the history of philosophy than Bueno and Zalta want, and that there’s a reason why the notion has been found baffling by some.

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Author Profiles

Franz Berto
University of St. Andrews
Filippo Casati
Lehigh University
Graham Priest
CUNY Graduate Center

References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Truth in fiction.David K. Postscripts to Lewis - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1):37--46.
Impossible Worlds.Francesco Berto & Mark Jago - 2019 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Creatures of Fiction.Peter van Inwagen - 1977 - American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (4):299 - 308.

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