Normativity and rationality in delusional psychiatric disorders

Mind and Language 16 (5):457-493 (2001)
Abstract
Psychiatric treatment and diagnosis rests upon a richer conception of normativity than, for example, cognitive neuropsychology. This paper explores the role that considerations of rationality can play in defining this richer conception of normativity. It distinguishes two types of rationality and considers how each type can break down in different ways in delusional psychiatric disorders
Keywords Disorder  Normativity  Psychiatry  Rationality  Science
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DOI 10.1111/1468-0017.00179
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