(Probably) Not companions in guilt

Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2285-2308 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX


In this paper, I will attempt to develop and defend a common form of intuitive resistance to the companions in guilt argument. I will argue that one can reasonably believe there are promising solutions to the access problem for mathematical realism that don’t translate to moral realism. In particular, I will suggest that the structuralist project of accounting for mathematical knowledge in terms of some form of logical knowledge offers significant hope of success while no analogous approach offers such hope for moral realism.

Similar books and articles


Added to PP

712 (#25,392)

6 months
218 (#15,175)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Sharon Berry
Indiana University, Bloomington

Citations of this work

Debunking arguments.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (12):e12638.
Coincidence Avoidance and Formulating the Access Problem.Sharon Berry - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):687-701.
Coincidence Avoidance and Formulating the Access Problem.Sharon E. Berry - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):687 - 701.
Mathematical and Moral Disagreement.Silvia Jonas - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):302-327.
The ethics–mathematics analogy.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 15 (1):e12641.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Being Realistic About Reasons.Thomas M. Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Science Without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism.Hartry H. Field - 1980 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.
Saving truth from paradox.Hartry H. Field - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 49 references / Add more references