Abstract

This dissertation opens with a discussion and clarification of the Classical Computational Theory of Mind . An alleged challenge to this theory, which derives from research into connectionist systems, is then briefly outlined and connectionist systems are introduced in some detail. Several claims which have been made on behalf of connectionist systems are then examined, these purport to support the conclusion that connectionist systems provide better models of the mind and cognitive functioning than the CCTM. It is argued that most claims made on behalf of connectionism often amount to little more than myths. A significant difficulty with standard connectionist research methodology is then described. This difficulty derives from the fact that connectionist systems are seldom subject to detailed analysis and interpretation after training and has serious consequences for the plausibility of connectionist research in cognitive science and as the basis for a challenge to the CCTM. A technique for network analysis is described in detail and the results from the analysis of a particular network are then introduced, in order to show how these difficulties can be overcome. The analyzed network exhibited a number of surprising and intriguing properties. These properties provide the basis for a detailed assessment of the network with respect to the CCTM. There then follows a discussion of the results of the network analysis, with respect to two features which are commonly associated with the CCTM, namely systematicity and compositionality. It is argued that the network has some properties similar to those associated with the CCTM and exhibits, in a weak sense, compositionality and systematicity. It is aiso argued that the network amounts to a genuinely cognitive theory. This suggests that there is insufficient evidence at the current time to determine whether or not connectionism presents a genuine challenge to the CCTM. The plausibility of the claim that networks provide the basis of an alternative to the CCTM is then traced, in part, to a revisionist tendency in some contemporary histories of connectionist research. Finally, future research directions in philosophy and cognitive science are suggested