Object lessons: Spelke principles and psychological explanation

Philosophical Psychology 18 (3):289-312 (2005)

Abstract
There is general agreement that from the first few months of life, our apprehension of physical objects accords, in some sense, with certain principles. In one philosopher's locution, we are 'perceptually sensitive' to physical principles describing the behavior of objects. But in what does this accordance or sensitivity consist? Are these principles explicitly represented or merely 'implemented'? And what sort of explanation do we accomplish in claiming that our object perception accords with these principles? My main goal here is to suggest answers to these questions. I argue that the object principles are not explicitly represented, first addressing some confusion in the debate about what that means. On the positive side, I conclude that the principles supply a competence account, at Marr's computational level, and that they function like natural constraints in vision. These are among their considerable explanatory benefits - benefits endowed by rules and principles in other cognitive domains as well. Characterizing the explanatory role of the object principles is my main project here, but in pursuing certain sub-goals I am led to other conclusions of interest in their own right. I address an argument that the object principles are explicitly represented which assumes that object perception is substantially thought-like. This provokes a jaunt off the main path which leads to interesting territory: the boundary between thought and perception. I argue that object apprehension is much closer to perception than to thought on the spectrum between the two
Keywords Epistemology  Explanation  Object  Perception  Psychology  Representation  Thought  Spelke, Elizabeth S
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DOI 10.1080/09515080500177275
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References found in this work BETA

Word and Object.W. QUINE - 1960 - MIT Press.
The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.

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