Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (11-12):8-32 (2019)

Authors
Jacob Berger
Lycoming College
Myrto Mylopoulos
Carleton University
Abstract
While there seems to be much evidence that perceptual states can occur without being conscious, some theorists recently express scepticism about unconscious perception. We explore here two kinds of such scepticism: Megan Peters and Hakwan Lau's experimental work regarding the well-known problem of the criterion -- which seems to show that many purported instances of unconscious perception go unreported but are weakly conscious -- and Ian Phillips' theoretical consideration, which he calls the 'problem of attribution' -- the worry that many purported examples of unconscious perception are not perceptual, but rather merely informational and subpersonal. We argue that these concerns do not undermine the evidence for unconscious perception and that this sceptical approach results in a dilemma for the sceptic, who must either deny that there is unconscious mentality generally or explain why perceptual states are unique in the mind such that they cannot occur unconsciously. Both options, we argue, are problematic.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Perceptual Consciousness Plays No Epistemic Role.Jacob Berger - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):7-23.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Perception and Scepticism.Andrew Ward - 1993 - In Edmond Leo Wright (ed.), New Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception. Brookfield: Avebury. pp. 88.
Unconscious Perception and Perceptual Knowledge.Paweł J. Zięba - 2017 - In Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), The Philosophy of Perception and Observation. Contributions of the 40th International Wittgenstein Symposium August 6-12, 2017 Kirchberg am Wechsel. Kirchberg am Wechsel: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 301-303.
Perception and Scepticism.Ranjan Umapathy - 1998 - American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (2):111-128.
Unconscious Perception, Part II.Godfrey N. A. Vesey - 1960 - Aristotelian Society 67:67-78.
McDowell, Scepticism, and the 'Veil of Perception'.David Macarthur - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):175-190.
Unconscious Perception: The Need for a Paradigm Shift.Daniel Holender & Katia Duscherer - 2004 - Perception and Psychophysics 66 (5):872-881.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-11-18

Total views
182 ( #58,885 of 2,454,835 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
41 ( #19,524 of 2,454,835 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes