Philosophical Studies 130 (1):81-104 (2005)
This paper argues that Sosa’s virtue perspectivism fails to combine satisfactorily internalist and externalist features in a single theory. Internalism and externalism are reconciled at the price of creating a Gettier problem at the level of “reflective” or second-order knowledge. The general lesson to be learned from the critique of virtue perspectivism is that internalism and externalism cannot be combined by bifurcating justification and knowledge into an object-level and a meta-level and assigning externalism and internalism to different levels
|Keywords||Compatibilism Epistemology Externalism Internalism Justification Knowledge Perspectivism Sosa, Ernest|
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References found in this work BETA
Tracking, Competence, and Knowledge.Ernest Sosa - 2002 - In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 264--287.
Citations of this work BETA
Two for the Show: Anti-Luck and Virtue Epistemologies in Consonance.Guy Axtell - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):363 - 383.
Agent Reliabilism and the Problem of Clairvoyance.Sven Bernecker - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):164–172.
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