Prospects for epistemic compatibilism

Philosophical Studies 130 (1):81-104 (2005)
Abstract
This paper argues that Sosa’s virtue perspectivism fails to combine satisfactorily internalist and externalist features in a single theory. Internalism and externalism are reconciled at the price of creating a Gettier problem at the level of “reflective” or second-order knowledge. The general lesson to be learned from the critique of virtue perspectivism is that internalism and externalism cannot be combined by bifurcating justification and knowledge into an object-level and a meta-level and assigning externalism and internalism to different levels
Keywords Compatibilism  Epistemology  Externalism  Internalism  Justification  Knowledge  Perspectivism  Sosa, Ernest
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-005-3235-z
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge in Perspective.Ernest Sosa - 1991 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Reflective Knowledge in the Best Circles.Ernest Sosa - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (8):410-430.
An Internalist Externalism.William P. Alston - 1988 - Synthese 74 (3):265 - 283.
Tracking, Competence, and Knowledge.Ernest Sosa - 2002 - In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 264--287.

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Citations of this work BETA
Agent Reliabilism and the Problem of Clairvoyance.Sven Bernecker - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):164–172.
Critical Notice.Christopher Lepock - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):131-149.

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