Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15:195-218 (2020)

Authors
Selim Berker
Harvard University
Abstract
Quasi-realists aim to account for many of the trappings of metanormative realism within an expressivist framework. Chief among these is the realist way of responding to the Euthyphro dilemma: quasi-realists want to join realists in being able to say, "It’s not the case that kicking dogs is wrong because we disapprove of it. Rather, we disapprove of kicking dogs because it’s wrong." However, the standard quasi-realist way of explaining what we are up to when we assert the first of these two sentences rests on a mistaken identification of metaphysical dependence (or grounding) with counterfactual covariation. This chapter proposes a better way for expressivists to understand such sentences, on which they serve to express complex states of mind in which an attitude bears a relation of psychological dependence (or basing) to another state of mind. It is argued that this proposal is a natural, versatile, and fruitful approach for expressivists to take that helps them secure the first half of the Euthyphro contrast—but at the cost of making it difficult to see how expressivists can make sense of that contrast’s second half.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction.Gideon Rosen - 2010 - In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 109-135.
A Guide to Ground.Kit Fine - 2012 - In Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding. Cambridge University Press. pp. 37--80.
On What Grounds What.Jonathan Schaffer - 2009 - In David Manley, David J. Chalmers & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press. pp. 347-383.
Essays in Quasi-Realism.Simon Blackburn - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
The Unity of Grounding.Selim Berker - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):729-777.

View all 29 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Is expressivism theologically acceptable?StJohn Lambert - 2021 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 90 (2):121-131.
How to Have Your Quasi-Cake and Quasi-Eat It Too.Sebastian Köhler - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Expressivism and Normative Metaphysics.Billy Dunaway - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11.
Explaining the Quasi-Real.Jamie Dreier - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 10.
Minimalist Semantics in Meta-Ethical Expressivism.Billy Dunaway - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):351 - 371.
I Can't Relax! You're Driving Me Quasi!Stephen Ingram - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3).
If You're Quasi-Explaining, You're Quasi-Losing.Derek Baker - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics 16. Oxford University Press.
Quasi-Realism's Problem of Autonomous Effects.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):392–409.
Expressivism, Belief, and All That.Sebastian Köhler - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (4):189-207.
Quasi-Realism and Fundamental Moral Error.Andy Egan - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):205 – 219.
Relaxing Realism or Deferring Debate?Michael Ridge - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (3):149-173.
Normative certitude for expressivists.Michael Ridge - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3325-3347.
Propositional Clothing and Belief.Neil Sinclair - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):342-362.
Making Quasi-Realists Admit of Fundamental Moral Fallibility.Garrett Lam - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):294-303.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-01-24

Total views
144 ( #76,564 of 2,462,368 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
39 ( #22,569 of 2,462,368 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes