Erkenntnis:1-18 (forthcoming)

Abstract
Invoking a form of quantifier variance promises to let us explain mathematicians’ freedom to introduce new kinds of mathematical objects in a way that avoids some problems for standard platonist and nominalist views. In this paper I’ll note that, despite traditional associations between quantifier variance and Carnapian rejection of metaphysics, Siderian realists about metaphysics can naturally be quantifier variantists. Unfortunately a variant on the Quinean indispensability argument concerning grounding seems to pose a problem for philosophers who accept this hybrid. However I will charitably reconstruct this problem and then argue for optimism about solving it.
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-020-00298-1
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References found in this work BETA

Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Mathematical Truth.Paul Benacerraf - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.
The Construction of Logical Space.Agustín Rayo - 2013 - Oxford University Press.

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