Revisiting the argument from fetal potential

Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2:7 (2007)
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Abstract

One of the most famous, and most derided, arguments against the morality of abortion is the argument from potential, which maintains that the fetus' potential to become a person and enjoy the valuable life common to persons, entails that its destruction is prima facie morally impermissible. In this paper, I will revisit and offer a defense of the argument from potential

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References found in this work

A Defense of Abortion.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1971 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1):47-66.
Abortion and Infanticide.Michael Tooley - 1972 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (1):37-65.
Arguing From Potential.Stephen Buckle - 1988 - Bioethics 2 (3):227–253.
Why Potentiality Still Matters.Jim Stone - 1994 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):281 - 293.

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