Philosophical Psychology 7 (1):87-100 (1994)
This paper contests Lynne Rudder Baker's claim to have shown that eliminative materialism is bound to fail on purely conceptual grounds. It is argued that Baker's position depends on knowing that certain developments in science cannot occur, and that we cannot know that this is so. Consequently, the sort of argument Baker provides is question-begging. For similar reasons, the confidence that the proponents of eliminative materialism have in it is misplaced.
|Keywords||Eliminativism Epistemology Materialism Science Baker, L|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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