Erkenntnis 84 (3):559-575 (2018)

Authors
Franz Berto
University of St. Andrews
Abstract
I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM belief revision theory. belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to trivialization; and revision can be subject to ‘framing effects’: logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. Such results are obtained without resorting to non-classical logics, or to non-normal or impossible worlds semantics. The framework combines, instead, a standard semantics for propositional S5 with a simple mereology of contents.
Keywords Framing Effects  Hyperintensionality  Belief Revision  non monotonic Reasoning  Doxastic Logic  Epistemic Logic  Inconsistent Belief Management
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Reprint years 2018, 2019
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-018-9971-1
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References found in this work BETA

Index.Stephen Yablo - 2014 - In Aboutness. Princeton University Press. pp. 219-222.
Angellic Content.Kit Fine - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (2):199-226.
Aboutness in Imagination.Franz Berto - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1871-1886.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Fundamental Problem of Logical Omniscience.Peter Hawke, Aybüke Özgün & Francesco Berto - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (4):727-766.

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