Simple Hyperintensional Belief Revision

Erkenntnis 84 (3):559-575 (2019)
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Abstract

I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM belief revision theory. (Revised) belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to trivialization; and revision can be subject to ‘framing effects’: logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. Such results are obtained without resorting to non-classical logics, or to non-normal or impossible worlds semantics. The framework combines, instead, a standard semantics for propositional S5 with a simple mereology of contents.

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Franz Berto
University of St. Andrews

Citations of this work

Dynamic Hyperintensional Belief Revision.Aybüke Özgün & Francesco Berto - 2021 - Review of Symbolic Logic (3):766-811.
The Logic of Framing Effects.Francesco Berto & Aybüke Özgün - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (3):939-962.
The Fundamental Problem of Logical Omniscience.Peter Hawke, Aybüke Özgün & Francesco Berto - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (4):727-766.
Hyperintensionality.Francesco Berto & Daniel Nolan - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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Knowledge and belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.
Aboutness.Stephen Yablo - 2014 - Oxford: Princeton University Press.
In contradiction: a study of the transconsistent.Graham Priest - 1987 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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