Skeptical theism and Rowe's new evidential argument from evil

Noûs 35 (2):278–296 (2001)
Authors
Michael Bergmann
Purdue University
Abstract
Skeptical theists endorse the skeptical thesis (which is consistent with the rejection of theism) that we have no good reason for thinking the possible goods we know of are representative of the possible goods there are. In his newest formulation of the evidential arguments from evil, William Rowe tries to avoid assuming the falsity of this skeptical thesis, presumably because it seems so plausible. I argue that his new argument fails to avoid doing this. Then I defend that skeptical thesis against objections, thereby supporting my contention that relying on its falsity is a weakness in an argument
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DOI 10.1111/0029-4624.00297
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Moral Enhancement and Moral Freedom: A Critique of the Little Alex Problem.John Danaher - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 83:233-250.
Skeptical Theism.Justin P. McBrayer - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (7):611-623.
Sceptical Theism and the Evil-God Challenge.Perry Hendricks - 2018 - Religious Studies 54 (4):549-561.
The Problem of Evil: Skeptical Theism Leads to Moral Paralysis.Scott Sehon - 2010 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67 (2):67 - 80.

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