What is Wrong with Deductivism?

Informal Logic 40 (3):295-316 (2020)
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In “Deductivism as an Interpretative Strategy: A Reply to Groarke’s Defense of Reconstructive Deductivism,” David Godden distinguished two notions of deductivism. On the one hand, as an interpretative thesis, deductivism is the view that all-natural language argumentation must be interpreted as being deductive. On the other hand, as an evaluative thesis, deductivism is the view that for a conclusion to follow, it has to follow of necessity from the premises—or, in other words, that being a good inference implies being deductive. The main goal of this paper is to show that evaluative deductivism is wrong.



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Lilian Bermejo Luque
University of Granada

References found in this work

The Uses of Argument.Stephen E. Toulmin - 1958 - Cambridge University Press.
The Uses of Argument.Stephen E. Toulmin - 1958 - Philosophy 34 (130):244-245.

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