What’s Not Wrong with Foundationalism

Abstract

One thing all forms of foundationalism have in common is that they hold that a belief can be justified noninferentially--i.e., that its justification need not depend on its being inferred from some other justified (or unjustified) belief. In some recent publications, Peter Klein argues that in virtue of having this feature, all forms of foundationalism are infected with an unacceptable arbitrariness that makes it irrational to be a practicing foundationalist. In this paper, I will explain why his objections to foundationalism fail

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Michael Bergmann
Purdue University

References found in this work

The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and Evidence.Paul K. Moser - 1989 - Cambridge University Press.
Replies to My Three Critics. [REVIEW]Richard Fumerton - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):927.

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