Williamson on Counterpossibles

Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (4):693-713 (2018)

Authors
Franz Berto
University of St. Andrews
David Ripley
Monash University
Rohan French
University of California, Davis
1 more
Abstract
A counterpossible conditional is a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent. Common sense delivers the view that some such conditionals are true, and some are false. In recent publications, Timothy Williamson has defended the view that all are true. In this paper we defend the common sense view against Williamson’s objections.
Keywords Impossible Worlds  Counterpossible Conditionals  Nonvacuism  Counterfactual modal epistemology
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DOI 10.1007/s10992-017-9446-x
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References found in this work BETA

Guide to Ground.Kit Fine - 2012 - In Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding. Cambridge University Press. pp. 37--80.
Grounding in the Image of Causation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):49-100.
The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):455-464.

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Citations of this work BETA

Knowledge of Objective Modality.Margot Strohminger & Juhani Yli-Vakkuri - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1155-1175.
Counteridenticals.Alexander W. Kocurek - 2018 - The Philosophical Review 127 (3):323-369.
Explanation impossible.Sam Baron & Mark Colyvan - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-18.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

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