Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (4):693-713 (2018)

Authors
Franz Berto
University of St. Andrews
David Ripley
Monash University
Graham Priest
CUNY Graduate Center
1 more
Abstract
A counterpossible conditional is a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent. Common sense delivers the view that some such conditionals are true, and some are false. In recent publications, Timothy Williamson has defended the view that all are true. In this paper we defend the common sense view against Williamson’s objections.
Keywords Impossible Worlds  Counterpossible Conditionals  Nonvacuism  Counterfactual modal epistemology
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DOI 10.1007/s10992-017-9446-x
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References found in this work BETA

Counterfactuals.David Kellogg Lewis - 1973 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Blackwell.
Guide to Ground.Kit Fine - 2012 - In Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding. Cambridge University Press. pp. 37--80.

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Citations of this work BETA

Hyperintensionality.Francesco Berto & Daniel Nolan - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Sensitivity, Safety, and Impossible Worlds.Guido Melchior - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):713-729.
Counteridenticals.Alexander W. Kocurek - 2018 - The Philosophical Review 127 (3):323-369.
Counterfactual Scheming.Sam Baron - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):535-562.

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