Why the liar does not matter

Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (3):323-341 (2003)
Abstract
This paper develops a classical model for our ordinary use of the truth predicate (1) that is able to address the liar's paradox and (2) that satisfies a very strong version of deflationism. Since the model is a classical in the sense that it has no truth value gaps, the model is able to address Tarski's indictment of our ordinary use of the predicate as inconsistent. Moreover, since it is able to address the liar's paradox, it responds to arguments against deflationism based upon that paradox alone. The model is based upon a notion of the complexity of propositions that a fixed set of speakers might express. A context-sensitive definition of the truth predicate is then provided based upon a class of possible worlds defined in terms of these speakers. Reasonable constraints on the memories and lifetimes of ordinary speakers are used to limit the set of propositions that they might express so that deflationist requirements are satisfied
Keywords deflationism  Liar's paradox  truth
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1024217005330
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