You Can't Always Get (or Give) What You Want: Preferences and Their Limits

Hastings Center Report 48 (3):40-40 (2018)
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Abstract

People who lack decision‐making capacity may be able to communicate preferences, which can and should inform surrogate decision‐making on their behalf. It is unclear whether making a further distinction about “capacity for preferences,” as Jason Wasserman and Mark Navin propose in this issue of the Hastings Center Report, would improve the process of surrogate decision‐making. Anyone who is regularly involved in surrogate decision‐making or who has worked to articulate decision‐making standards and processes can think of cases in which a patient's voice was ignored or his or her preferences and ability to communicate them overlooked. However, we can also think of cases in which it was unclear whether information provided by a patient, recently or in the past, should have been characterized as a preference relevant to a medical decision that the patient lacked the capacity to make. We should also recognize that clear preferences of a patient who lacks decision‐making capacity may conflict with the limits of another person or of a family's resources such that these preferences cannot guide a surrogate's decision. This patient will not get what he wants. A situation in which preferences are known and make sense but cannot be applied in a feasible way demonstrates the limits of the medical decision‐making framework concerning care that is not covered by medical insurance.

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