Theoria 83 (4):419-439 (2017)

Authors
Brian Besong
Ohio Dominican University
Abstract
Does having an initially high level of justified confidence in a belief vindicate remaining steadfast in the face of disagreement? According to one prominent view in the literature, namely Jennifer Lackey's justificationist position, the answer is yes so long as one also has personal information that provides a symmetry-breaker. In this article, I raise a problem for the justificationist view. On the most straightforward reading of the justificationist position, personal information always provides a symmetry-breaker in a peer dispute over a belief in which one has high justified confidence. However, this position is implausibly strong because it renders epistemically permissible a dogmatic attitude in a relevant set of peer disagreements. Alternatively, weaker readings of the view fail to provide a perspicuous account of when high justified confidence matters in a disagreement.
Keywords confidence  disagreement  justificationism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/theo.12134
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.John Locke - 1979 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 169 (2):221-222.
Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):234-237.
What Should We Do When We Disagree?J. Lackey - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3.

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Method of Cases in Context. [REVIEW]Alison Springle - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (4):597-608.
Disagreement, Dogmatism, and the Bounds of Philosophy. [REVIEW]Nick Hughes - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (4):591-596.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:145-154.
A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - In Alan Millar Adrian Haddock & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 145-154.
Discovering Disagreeing Epistemic Peers and Superiors.Bryan Frances - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):1 - 21.
The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief.James Hawthorne - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Synthese Library: Springer. pp. 49--74.
Some Problems With Steadfast Strategies for Rational Disagreement.Hamid Vahid - 2014 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 1 (1):89-107.
How to Set a Surprise Exam.Ned Hall - 1999 - Mind 108 (432):647-703.
Shooting with Confidence.Kevin Kinghorn - 2007 - In Jerry Walls & Gregory Bassham (eds.), Basketball and Philosophy. University Press of Kentucky. pp. 185-195.
What Should We Do When We Disagree?Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 274-93.
Confidence, Evidence, and Disagreement.Katia Vavova - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):173-183.
How Common is Peer Disagreement? On Self‐Trust and Rational Symmetry.Karl Schafer - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):25-46.
On Confidence.Nathan Rotenstreich - 1972 - Philosophy 47 (182):348 - 358.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-10-25

Total views
95 ( #99,744 of 2,348,586 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #186,189 of 2,348,586 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes