Dialogue 50 (2):347-365 (2011)

Authors
Thomas M. Besch
Wuhan University
Abstract
The paper argues that applications of the principle that “ought” implies “can” (OIC) depend on normative considerations even if the link between “ought” and “can” is logical in nature. Thus, we should reject a common, “factualist” conception of OIC and endorse weak “normativism”. Even if we use OIC as the rule ““cannot” therefore “not ought””, applying OIC is not a mere matter of facts and logic, as factualists claim, but often draws on “proto-ideals” of moral agency.
Keywords Ought implies can  normativity  factualism  normativism  proto-ideals
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/s0012217311000308
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals.Immanuel Kant - 1785/2002 - Oxford University Press.
Freedom and Reason.R. M. Hare - 1963 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.
I Ought, Therefore I Can.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):167-216.
Does Thought Imply Ought?Krister Bykvist & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2007 - Analysis 67 (4):277–285.
Reasons and Impossibility.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):351-384.

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

‘Ought Implies Can’: Not So Pragmatic After All.Alex King - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):637-661.
The Normative Stance.Sven Ove Hansson - 2014 - Theoria 80 (2):113-115.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Resisting Normativism in Psychology.Georges Rey - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
Internalized Meaning Factualism.Jakob Hohwy - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (3):325-336..
Deflationism, Truth-Aptness and Non-Factualism.Massimiliano Vignolo - 2008 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (1):84-103.
Moral Dilemmas Are Not a Local Issue.Dirk Baltzly - 2000 - Philosophy 75 (2):245-263.
‘Ought’, ‘Can’, and Practical Reasons.Clayton Littlejohn - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):363-73.
The Three Quines.John Fennell - 2003 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (3):261 – 292.
“The Meaning of 'Meaning is Normative' ”.John Fennell - 2013 - Philosophical Investigations 36 (1):56-78.
Semantic Naturalism and Normativity.Nenad Smokrović - 2002 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):71-81.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-06-14

Total views
637 ( #9,633 of 2,432,816 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
44 ( #17,659 of 2,432,816 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes