Logical knowledge and Gettier cases

Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):1-19 (2009)
Abstract
Knowledge of the basic rules of logic is often thought to be distinctive, for it seems to be a case of non-inferential a priori knowledge. Many philosophers take its source to be different from those of other types of knowledge, such as knowledge of empirical facts. The most prominent account of knowledge of the basic rules of logic takes this source to be the understanding of logical expressions or concepts. On this account, what explains why such knowledge is distinctive is that it is grounded in semantic or conceptual understanding. However, I show that this cannot be the correct account of knowledge of the basic rules of logic, because it is open to Gettier-style counter-examples.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.565.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,804
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Implicit Definition and the Application of Logic.Thomas Kroedel - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (1):131-148.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Gettier Problems.Stephen Hetherington - 2005 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
What Good Are Counterexamples?Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (1):1-31.
Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases.Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press.
Self-Knowledge: Rationalism Vs. Empiricism.Aaron Z. Zimmerman - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (2):325–352.
Basic Knowledge and Easy Understanding.Kelly Becker - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (2):145-161.
Is Knowledge Justified True Belief?John Turri - 2012 - Synthese 184 (3):247-259.
Implicit Definition and the Application of Logic.Thomas Kroedel - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (1):131-148.
What Should a Theory of Knowledge Do?Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):561-579.
Justification in Context.Matjaž Potrč & Vojko Strahovnik - 2005 - Acta Analytica 20 (9):91-104.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

357 ( #7,511 of 2,158,904 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #52,828 of 2,158,904 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums