Journal of East-West Thought 3 (4):51-64 (2013)

Thomas M. Besch
Wuhan University
Can there be a "reflexive" or presuppositional, reasonably non-rejectable grounding of a Forst-type right to justification, or of a meaningful form of constitutive discursive standing? The paper argues that this is not so, and this for reasons that reflect more general limitations of presuppositional arguments for relevantly contested conclusions. To this end, the paper critically engages Forst's "reflexive" argument for human rights. It also considers O'Neill's presuppositional attempt to defend a form of cosmopolitanism, as well as the attempt to anchor constructivist conclusions in the meaning of the word "reasonable".
Keywords Presuppositional arguments  human rights  right to justification  Forst  O'Neill  Scanlon  respect
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Contractualism and Utilitarianism.Thomas M. Scanlon - 1982 - In Amartya Kumar Sen & Bernard Arthur Owen Williams (eds.), Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge University Press. pp. 103--128.
Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy.Thomas Nagel - 1987 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 16 (3):215-240.
Political Liberalism.Charles Larmore - 1990 - Political Theory 18 (3):339-360.

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