Dialogue 58 (3):1-26 (2019)

Authors
Thomas M. Besch
Wuhan University
Abstract
This paper explores the idea of robust discursive equality on which respect-based conceptions of justificatory reciprocity often draw. I distinguish between formal and substantive discursive equality and argue that if justificatory reciprocity requires that people be accorded formally equal discursive standing, robust discursive equality should not be construed as requiring standing that is equal substantively, or in terms of its discursive purchase. Still, robust discursive equality is purchase sensitive: it does not obtain when discursive standing is impermissibly unequal in purchase. I then showcase different candidate conceptions of purchase justice, and draw conclusions about the substantive commitments of justificatory reciprocity.
Keywords Public justification  Reciprocity  Respect  Equality  Discursive equality
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2019
DOI 10.1017/s0012217318000495
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Political Liberalism.John Rawls - 1993 - Columbia University Press.
Justice as Fairness: A Restatement.John Rawls (ed.) - 2001 - Harvard University Press.
The Problem of Global Justice.Thomas Nagel - 2005 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (2):113-147.

View all 35 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Forst on Reciprocity of Reasons: A Critique.Thomas M. Besch - 2020 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 58 (3):357-382.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-06-18

Total views
254 ( #35,749 of 2,432,260 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
49 ( #15,749 of 2,432,260 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes