Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (3):361-383 (2008)

Authors
Lorraine L. Besser
Middlebury College
Abstract
Most moral theories purport to make claims upon agents, yet often it is not clear why those claims are ones that can be justifiably demanded of agents. In this paper, I develop a justification of moral requirements that explains why it is that morality makes legitimate claims on agents. This justification is grounded in the idea that there is an essential connection between morality and psychological well-being. I go on to suggest how, using this justification as a springboard, we might be able to develop a viable theory of moral requirements that maintains the strict and demanding status we take to be distinctive of moral requirements, yet avoids worries of alienation.
Keywords OBLIGATION   MORAL MOTIVATION   PERSONAL INTEGRITY   PRIDE   ALIENATION   WELL-BEING
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DOI 10.1163/174552408X369718
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References found in this work BETA

Trust and Antitrust.Annette Baier - 1986 - Ethics 96 (2):231-260.
Persons, Character, and Morality.Bernard Williams - 1981 - In James Rachels (ed.), Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980. Cambridge University Press.
The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories.Michael Stocker - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (14):453-466.
The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories.Michael Stocker - 1997 - In Roger Crisp & Michael Slote (eds.), Virtue Ethics. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Integrity.Damian Cox - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Integrity Objection, Reloaded.Jill Hernandez - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (2):145-162.

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