Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (1):26 – 51 (1988)

Abstract
A new story is abroad that plato possessed two redundant devices in the "phaedo" to explain why some sensible "f" (a drift of snow, say) is "g" but never not-"g" (cold, say): (i) "f" participates in a special way in the (upper world) forms "f" and "g"; (ii) "f" is essentially "g" in its own (lower world) right. Were there such genuinely redundant devices, this would tidily explain both plato's coming to reject essential properties for sensibles in the "republic" and aristotle's coming to reject forms for sensibles in the "categories". Now it is true in the "phaedo" that sensible "f" particulars can indeed by "g" and never not-"g", yet no redundant "essentialist" doctrine occurs there. Plato's reasoning is through and through form-ist: an "f" particular has a "participation" relation to the form "f", which form "f" has an "invariable accompaniment" relation to the form "g", which form "g" can never itself be not-"g"; the form "g"'s own never-not-"g" constraints thence get percolated back down the line of these canonical two worlds relations, by a still little-noticed "back-passing principle."
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DOI 10.1080/00048408812350221
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