Theoria 83 (2):138-153 (2016)

Thomas M. Besch
Wuhan University
David Schmidtz's reconstruction of morality advances Hart-type recognition rules for a “personal” and an “interpersonal” strand of morality. I argue that his view does not succeed for reasons owed both to the way in which Schmidtz construes of the task of reconstructing morality and the content of the moral recognition rules that he proposes. For Schmidtz, this task must be approached from a Hart-type “internal” perspective, but this leaves his reconstruction with an unresolved problem of parochiality. He reconstructs morality as a pursuit of the aim of the flourishing of individuals as reflectively rational agents. However, while it is plausible to see reflective rationality as a good, it does not seem to be a morally fundamental good. Ways to instantiate or pursue it depend for their moral value on other, more fundamental moral values that are beyond the normative space mapped by Schmidtz's moral recognition rules.
Keywords reflective rationality  morality  Schmidtz  recognition rules
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1111/theo.12114
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
The Concept of Law.Stuart M. Brown - 1963 - Philosophical Review 72 (2):250.
Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy.Thomas Nagel - 1987 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 16 (3):215-240.

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Fichte and Hegel on Recognition.James Alexander Clarke - 2009 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (2):365-385.
Recognition of Continuous Speech Requires Top-Down Processing.Kenneth N. Stevens - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (3):348-348.
On Recognition.Kristina Sabikova - 2009 - Filozofia 64 (4):356-361.
Virtues and Moral Rules — a Reply.Bernard Gert - 1998 - Philosophia 26 (3-4):489-494.
Dewey and Dancy and the Moral Authority of Rules.Tom Spector - 2007 - Contemporary Pragmatism 4 (2):65-75.
Is the Rule of Recognition Really a Conventional Rule?Julie Dickson - 2007 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 27 (3):373-402.
Pro-Tanto Obligations and Ceteris-Paribus Rules.Danny Frederick - 2015 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (3):255-266.
General Rules in the Moral Theories of Smith and Hume.Gabriela Remow - 2007 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 5 (2):119-134.
Reason, Recognition, and Internal Critique.Antti Kauppinen - 2002 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):479 – 498.


Added to PP index

Total views
506 ( #13,795 of 2,433,251 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
49 ( #15,566 of 2,433,251 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes