Gregor Betz
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
Climate models don’t give us probabilistic forecasts. To interpret their results, alternatively, as serious possibilities seems problematic inasmuch as climate models rely on contrary-to-fact assumptions: why should we consider their implications as possible if their assumptions are known to be false? The paper explores a way to address this possibilistic challenge. It introduces the concepts of a perfect and of an imperfect credible world, and discusses whether climate models can be interpreted as imperfect credible worlds. That would allow one to use models for possibilistic prediction and salvage widespread scientific practice
Keywords Climate model  Possibility  Scenario  Credible world  Prediction  Representation  Uncertainty  Idealisation
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DOI 10.1007/s13194-015-0108-y
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References found in this work BETA

Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach.Jeffrey S. Poland - 1988 - Philosophical Review 100 (4):653-656.
Three Kinds of Idealization.Michael Weisberg - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (12):639-659.

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Values and Evidence: How Models Make a Difference.Wendy S. Parker & Eric Winsberg - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (1):125-142.

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