Are climate models credible worlds? Prospects and limitations of possibilistic climate prediction

European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (2):191-215 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Climate models don’t give us probabilistic forecasts. To interpret their results, alternatively, as serious possibilities seems problematic inasmuch as climate models rely on contrary-to-fact assumptions: why should we consider their implications as possible if their assumptions are known to be false? The paper explores a way to address this possibilistic challenge. It introduces the concepts of a perfect and of an imperfect credible world, and discusses whether climate models can be interpreted as imperfect credible worlds. That would allow one to use models for possibilistic prediction and salvage widespread scientific practice

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-02-22

Downloads
114 (#143,644)

6 months
9 (#144,029)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Gregor Betz
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

Values and evidence: how models make a difference.Wendy S. Parker & Eric Winsberg - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (1):125-142.
When is an Ensemble like a Sample?Corey Dethier - 2022 - Synthese 200 (52):1-22.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations