Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean Scepticism

Philosophical Review 112 (1):100-102 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The opening chapter of this book presents the skepticism of Sextus Empiricus as far more interesting than any of the varieties of skepticism typically discussed today. It is claimed that the skeptic in Sextus’s understanding quite generally “denies our claim to have rationally justified beliefs” ; by contrast, contemporary skeptical worries about whether we can really have knowledge—whatever exactly that amounts to—are stigmatized as absurdly trivial, and also out of touch with skepticism’s historical origins. The remainder of the book promises to justify this interpretation of Sextus’s skepticism, and to show that such a skepticism is not subject to the standard objections that it would be self-refuting and unlivable.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-09-12

Downloads
76 (#197,826)

6 months
2 (#658,848)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Richard Bett
Johns Hopkins University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Greek Skepticism.Charlotte L. Stough - 1972 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 32 (3):417-419.

Add more references