The road from vienna to lvov twardowski’s theory of judgement between 1894 and 1897

Grazer Philosophische Studien 67 (1):1-20 (2004)
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Abstract

In several manuscripts, written between 1894 and 1897, Twardowski developed a new theory of judgement with two types of judgement: existential and relational judgements. In Zur Lehre he tried to stay within a Brentanian framework, although he introduced the distinction between content and object in the theory of judgement. The introduction of this distinction forced Twardowski to revise further Brentano'stheory.His changes concerned judgements about relations and about non-present objects. The latter are considered special cases of relational judgements. The existential judgements are analysed in a Brentanian way; whereas relational judgements are analysed in a Brentanian way only as far as the act is concerned, but not when it comes to the object: the object of a relational judgement is a relationship. With this notion of relationship Twardowski comes close to introducing a concept of state of affairs for the object of (relational) judgements.

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Author Profiles

Arianna Betti
University of Amsterdam
Maria Van Der Schaar
Leiden University

References found in this work

Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description.Bertrand Russell - 1917 - In Mysticism and logic. Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications. pp. 152-167.
Meinong's theory of objects and values.J. N. Findlay - 1971 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 161:497-497.
Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1967 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27 (3):448-449.

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