Careful What You Wish

Philosophia 46 (1):21-38 (2018)
Authors
John Beverley
Northwestern University
Abstract
Dilip Ninan has raised a puzzle for centered world accounts of de re attitude reports extended to accommodate what he calls “counterfactual attitudes.” As a solution, Ninan introduces multiple centers to the standard centered world framework, resulting in a more robust semantics for de re attitude reports. However, while the so-called multi-centered world proposal solves Ninan’s counterfactual puzzle, this additional machinery is not without problems. In Section 1, I present the centered world account of attitude reports, followed by the extension to counterfactual attitudes which Ninan targets with his puzzle. In Section 2, I pose the counterfactual puzzle and present Ninan’s multi-centered world solution, emphasizing similarities and differences between multi-centered and centered world accounts of attitude reports. In Section 3, I argue the counterfactual attitude wishing falls under the purview of the multi-centered proposal, but that the proposal generates false predictions for wish reports concerning unsatisfiable content. I canvass responses, ultimately concluding Ninan’s proposal requires substantial revisions.
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-017-9906-0
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):42-47.
The Myth of the De Se.Ofra Magidor - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):249-283.
Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes.W. V. Quine - 1956 - Journal of Philosophy 53 (5):177-187.

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