Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):291-305 (2007)
I propose to apply a version of contextualism about knowledge to the special case that represents the topic of this volume. I begin by motivating my preferred version of contextualism, which may be labelled as conventionalist contextualism; here I start from a well-known problem that besets epistemic internalism (section I). Following this, I pose a problem for conventionalist contextualism and argue that it can be solved by invoking, first, the idea of what I shall call the lifewordly background of epistemic justifi cation, an idea originating from Husserl and Wittgenstein, and, secondly, the associated notion of normality, to be found in Husserl (section II). Finally, I apply the resulting conception of justification to philosophical knowledge, particularly focussing on the special role of intuitions (section III).
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Contextualist Approaches to Epistemology: Problems and Prospects.Elke Brendel & Christoph Jäger - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):143 - 172.
Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):77-95.
Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense.Keith DeRose - 1999 - In J. Greco & E. Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 187--205.
Contextualism, Assessor Relativism, and Insensitive Assessments.Gunnar Björnsson & Alexander Almér - 2009 - Logique Et Analyse 52 (208):363-372.
Contextualism, Closure, and the Knowledge Account of Assertion.Christopher Buford - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:111-121.
Who's a Pragmatist: Distinguishing Epistemic Pragmatism and Contextualism.Joseph W. Long - 2002 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 16 (1):39-49.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads58 ( #86,217 of 2,143,905 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #227,328 of 2,143,905 )
How can I increase my downloads?
There are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.