Induction and the Glue of the World

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (2):319-333 (2021)
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Abstract

Views which deny that there are necessary connections between distinct existences have often been criticized for leading to inductive skepticism. If there is no glue holding the world together then there seems to be no basis on which to infer from past to future. However, deniers of necessary connections have typically been unconcerned. After all, they say, everyone has a problem with induction. But, if we look at the connection between induction and explanation, we can develop the problem of induction in a way that hits deniers of necessary connections, but not their opponents. The denier of necessary connections faces an `internal' problem with induction -- skepticism about important inductive inferences naturally flows from their position in a way that it doesn't for those who accept necessary connections. This is a major problem, perhaps a fatal one, for the denial of necessary connections.

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Harjit Bhogal
University of Maryland, College Park

Citations of this work

Absolute Idealist Powers.Jesse M. Mulder - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):471-484.
Lawful Persistence.David Builes & Trevor Teitel - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives.
Calling for Explanation.Dan Baras - 2022 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

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References found in this work

Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
What is a Law of Nature?D. Armstrong - 1983 - Cambridge University Press.
Explanation and Scientific Understanding.Michael Friedman - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (1):5-19.
Explanatory Unification.Philip Kitcher - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (4):507-531.

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