Intentions and Intentionality

Matteo Bianchin
Università Milano-Bicocca
Michael Thompson recently advanced a “naïve action theory” as an alternative to the “sophisticated” accounts of action displayed by ordinary folk psychology. In what follows I defend the plausibility of intentional psychology and folk psychological explanations. I do this in two ways. First I question that naïve explanations are more naïve than the ones provided by folk psychology and suggest that the latter are phenomenologically prior to the former. Second, I focus on the role of intentionality in deliberation and action planning, suggesting that folk psychology provides a better answer than naïve theory to the question of what makes actions intentional.
Keywords Intentional action  Intentionality  Deliberation  Action Planning  Action explanation
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