Afferent isn't efferent, and language isn't logic, either

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):286-287 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Hurford's argument suffers from two major weaknesses. First, his account of neural mechanisms suggests no place in the brain where the two halves of a predicate-argument structure could come together. Second, his assumption that language and cognition must be based on logic is neither necessary nor particularly plausible, and leads him to some unlikely conclusions.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,873

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Artificial intelligence and personal identity.David Cole - 1991 - Synthese 88 (September):399-417.
Cognitive suicide.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1988 - In Robert H. Grimm & Daniel Davy Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought. Tucson. pp. 401--13.
Consciousness, Attention and Commonsense.F. de Brigard - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (9-10):189-201.
Why there still are no people.Jim Stone - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):174-191.
Language isn't quite that special.Joanna J. Bryson - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):679-680.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
31 (#529,929)

6 months
10 (#306,677)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references