Philosophical Topics 21 (1):21-52 (1993)
It is usually assumed in game theory that agents who interact strategically with each other are rational, know the strategies open to other agents as well as their payoffs and, moreover, have common knowledge of all the above. In some games, that much information is sufficient for the players to identify a "solution" and play it. The most commonly adopted solution concept is that of Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium is defined a combination of strategies, one for each player, such that no player can profit from a deviation from his strategy if the opponents stick to their strategies. Nash equilibrium is taken to have predictive power, in the sense that in order to predict how rational agents will in fact behave, it is enough to identify the equilibrium patterns of actions. Barring the case in which players have dominant strategies, to play her part in a Nash equilibrium a player must believe that the other players play their part, too. But an intelligent player must immediately realize that she has no ground for this belief. Take the case of a one-shot, simultaneous game. Here all undominated strategies are possible choices, and the beliefs supporting them are possible beliefs, even if this game has a..
|Keywords||Analytic Philosophy General Interest Philosophy of Mind|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Knowing and Supposing in Games of Perfect Information.Horacio Arló-Costa & Cristina Bicchieri - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (3):353 - 373.
Similar books and articles
Payoff Dominance and the Stackelberg Heuristic.Andrew M. Colman & Michael Bacharach - 1997 - Theory and Decision 43 (1):1-19.
Inconsistencies in Extensive Games.Martin Dufwenberg & Johan Lindén - 1996 - Erkenntnis 45 (1):103 - 114.
Nash Equilibrium with Lower Probabilities.Groes Ebbe, Jørgen Jacobsen Hans, Sloth Birgitte & Tranaes Torben - 1998 - Theory and Decision 44 (1):37-66.
On Stalnaker's Notion of Strong Rationalizability and Nash Equilibrium in Perfect Information Games.Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring - 1998 - Theory and Decision 45 (3):291-295.
A One-Person Doxastic Characterization of Nash Strategies.Andrés Perea - 2007 - Synthese 158 (2):251-271.
Overmathematisation in Game Theory: Pitting the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme Against the Epistemic Programme.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (3):290-300.
Common Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information.Philip J. Reny - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:363 - 369.
Counterfactual Reasoning and Common Knowledge of Rationality in Normal Form Games.Eduardo Zambrano - unknown
Added to index2010-12-22
Total downloads35 ( #145,318 of 2,158,904 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #353,777 of 2,158,904 )
How can I increase my downloads?