Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):677-678 (2002)
Although Carruthers’ proposals avoid some of the more obvious pitfalls that face analysts of the language-cognition relationship, they are needlessly complex and vitiated by his uncritical acceptance of a highly modular variety of evolutionary psychology. He pays insufficient attention both to the neural substrate of the processes he hypothesizes and to the evolutionary developments that gave rise to both language and human cognition.
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