Precis of Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account [Book Review]

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):231-238 (2005)
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Abstract

This book precis describes the motives behind my recent attempt to bring to bear “ruthlessly reductive” results from cellular and molecular neuroscience onto issues in the philosophy of mind. Since readers of this journal will probably be most interested in results addressing features of conscious experience, I highlight these most prominently. My main challenge is that philosophers (even scientifically-inspired ones) are missing the nature and scope of reductionism in contemporary neuroscience by focusing exclusively on higher-level cognitive neuroscience, and ignoring the discipline's cell-physiological and molecular-biological core

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John Bickle
Mississippi State University

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