Philosophy of Science 76 (5):612-623 (2009)

Justin B. Biddle
Georgia Institute of Technology
Helen Longino’s “contextual empiricism” is one of the most sophisticated recent attempts to defend a social theory of science. On this view, objectivity and epistemic acceptability require that research be produced within communities that approximate a Millian marketplace of ideas. I argue, however, that Longino’s embedding of her epistemology within the framework of Mill’s political liberalism implies a conception of individual epistemic agents that is incompatible with her view that scientific knowledge is necessarily social, and I begin to articulate an alternative conception that is better suited to a truly social theory of science. †To contact the author, please write to: School of Public Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology, 685 Cherry Street, Atlanta, GA 30332‐0345; e‐mail: [email protected]
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DOI 10.1086/605791
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A Critical Context For Longino’s Critical Contextual Empiricism.Miriam Solomon & Alan Richardson - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (1):211-222.

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Citations of this work BETA

A New Direction for Science and Values.Daniel J. Hicks - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3271-95.
State of the Field: Transient Underdetermination and Values in Science.Justin Biddle - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (1):124-133.
Illegitimate Values, Confirmation Bias, and Mandevillian Cognition in Science.Uwe Peters - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axy079.

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