Philosophy of Science 85 (3):360-379 (2018)

Authors
Justin B. Biddle
Georgia Institute of Technology
Abstract
This article argues that the controversy over genetically modified crops is best understood not in terms of the supposed bias, dishonesty, irrationality, or ignorance on the part of proponents or critics, but rather in terms of differences in values. To do this, the article draws on and extends recent work of the role of values and interests in science, focusing particularly on inductive risk and epistemic risk, and it shows how the GMO debate can help to further our understanding of the various epistemic risks that are present in science and how these risks might be managed.
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DOI 10.1086/697749
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References found in this work BETA

The Fate of Knowledge.Helen E. Longino - 2002 - Princeton University Press.
Science, Truth, and Democracy.Philip Kitcher - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
Science, Truth, and Democracy.A. Bird - 2003 - Mind 112 (448):746-749.
Science in a Democratic Society.Philip Kitcher - 2011 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 101:95-112.

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Citations of this work BETA

A Taxonomy of Transparency in Science.Kevin C. Elliott - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-14.
Defending a Risk Account of Scientific Objectivity.Inkeri Koskinen - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

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