Axiomathes 15 (4):599-619 (2005)

Tomasz Bigaj
University of Warsaw
The article deals with one particular problem created by the counterfactual analysis of causality à la Lewis, namely the context-sensitivity problem or, as I prefer to call it, the background condition problem. It appears that Lewis’ counterfactual definition of causality cannot distinguish between proper causes and mere causal conditions – i.e. factors necessary for the effect to occur, but commonly not seen as causally efficacious. The proposal is put forward to amend the Lewis definition with a condition, based on the notion of cotenability, which would eliminate the problem. It is shown that the corrected definition of causality leads to the transitivity of the causal relation. Possible objections to the proposed solution, involving the assumption of indeterminism and the preemption cases, are given a thorough consideration.
Keywords causality  counterfactuals  possible worlds  transitivity  preemption
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DOI 10.1007/s10516-005-2487-8
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References found in this work BETA

Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
Causation.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
The Cement of the Universe.J. L. Mackie - 1974 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Studies in Logical Theory.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - Oxford: Blackwell.

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Citations of this work BETA

Causation Without Influence.Tomasz Bigaj - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (1):1-22.

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