Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):29-42 (2007)
This paper specifies two hypotheses that are intimated in recent research on empathy and mindreading. The first, the phenomenal simulation hypothesis, holds that those attributing mental states (i.e., mindreaders) sometimes simulate the phenomenal states of those to whom they are making attributions (i.e., targets). The second, the phenomenal mindreading hypothesis, holds that this phenomenal simulation plays an important role in some mental state attributions. After explicating these hypotheses, the paper focuses on the first. It argues that neuropsychological experiments on empathy and behavioral experiments on imitation provide good reason to think that mindreaders sometimes simulate targets' phenomenal states. Accordingly, the paper concludes, the phenomenal mindreading hypothesis merits consideration
|Keywords||EMOTIONAL FACIAL EXPRESSIONS NEURAL SYSTEMS BRAIN ACTIVITY EMPATHY PAIN RECOGNITION IMITATION COHERENCE EXPERIENCE PHYSIOLOGY|
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References found in this work BETA
Mirror Neurons and the Simulation Theory of Mind-Reading.Vittorio Gallese & Alvin Goldman - 1998 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2 (12):493-501.
The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oup Usa. pp. 520--533.
Folk Psychology.Stephen P. Stich & Shaun Nichols - 2002 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Blackwell. pp. 35-71.
Citations of this work BETA
Mirroring Versus Simulation: On the Representational Function of Simulation.Mitchell Herschbach - 2012 - Synthese 189 (3):483-513.
Phenomenal Concepts in Mindreading.Stephen Biggs - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):647 – 667.
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