European Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):732-763 (2017)

Authors
Alexandre Billon
Université Charles-de-Gaulle - Lille 3
Abstract
Basic self-awareness is the kind of self-awareness reflected in our standard use of the first-person. Patients suffering from severe forms of depersonalization often feel reluctant to use the first-person and can even, in delusional cases, avoid it altogether, systematically referring to themselves in the third-person. Even though it has been neglected since then, depersonalization has been extensively studied, more than a century ago, and used as probe for understanding the nature and the causal mechanisms of basic self-awareness. In this paper, I argue that depersonalized patients indeed have an impaired basic self-awareness, and that their study allows us both to favor one specific theory of basic self-awareness and to understand what is wrong with its rivals. According to the favored theory, which I call Cartesian, we are basically self-aware in virtue of being acquainted with ourselves through introspection.
Keywords Cotard syndrome  acquaintance  depersonalization  first‐person  illeism  mineness  self  self‐awareness
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Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1111/ejop.12168
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References found in this work BETA

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Citations of this work BETA

Acquaintance.Matt Duncan - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (3):e12727.
Cotard Syndrome, Self-Awareness, and I-Concepts.Rocco Joseph Gennaro - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (1):1-20.
The Feeling of Bodily Ownership.Adam Bradley - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):359-379.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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