Res Publica 22 (2):135-153 (2016)

Paul Billingham
Oxford University
According to political liberalism, laws must be justified to all citizens in order to be legitimate. Most political liberals have taken this to mean that laws must be justified by appeal to a specific class of ‘public reasons’, which all citizens can accept. In this paper I defend an alternative, convergence, model of public justification, according to which laws can be justified to different citizens by different reasons, including reasons grounded in their comprehensive doctrines. I consider three objections to such an account—that it undermines sincerity in public reason, that it underestimates the importance of shared values, and that it is insufficiently deliberative—and argue that convergence justifications are resilient to these objections. They should therefore be included within a theory of political liberalism, as a legitimate form of public justification. This has important implications for the obligations that political liberalism places upon citizens in their public deliberations and reason-giving, and might make the theory more attractive to some of its critics, particularly those sympathetic to religious belief.
Keywords Political liberalism  Public justification  Respect  Sincerity
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DOI 10.1007/s11158-015-9278-x
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References found in this work BETA

Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - Philosophy 52 (199):102-105.
Liberalism Without Perfection.Jonathan Quong - 2010 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Public Reason.Jonathan Quong - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Accessibility, Pluralism, and Honesty: A Defense of the Accessibility Requirement in Public Justification.Baldwin Wong - 2019 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy:1-25.
Public Reason, Non-Public Reasons, and the Accessibility Requirement.Jason Tyndal - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (8):1062-1082.
Against Hands-on Neutrality.Bouke De Vries - 2020 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 19 (4):424-446.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

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