Authors
Paul Billingham
Oxford University
Abstract
In his last works, John Rawls explicitly argued for an overlapping consensus on a family of reasonable liberal political conceptions of justice, rather than just one. This ‘Deep Version’ of political liberalism opens up new questions about the relationship between citizens’ political conceptions, from which they must draw and offer public reasons in their political advocacy, and their comprehensive doctrines. These questions centre on whether a reasonable citizen’s choice of political conception can be influenced by her comprehensive doctrine. In this paper I present two models of the relationship, which give contrasting answers to these questions, and defend the model that is more permissive with regard to the influence of comprehensive doctrines. This has important implications for our understanding of Rawlsian political liberalism, and reduces the force of objections that have been offered by theorists sympathetic to religion.
Keywords Comprehensive doctrines  Legitimacy  Overlapping consensus  Political liberalism  John Rawls
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Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1080/13698230.2015.1013734
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References found in this work BETA

Political Liberalism.J. Rawls - 1995 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57 (3):596-598.
Liberalism Without Perfection.Jonathan Quong - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
The Sincerity of Public Reason.Micah Schwartzman - 2011 - Journal of Political Philosophy 19 (4):375-398.
The Ethics of Reasoning From Conjecture.Micah Schwartzman - 2012 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (4):521-544.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Epistemic Limits of Shared Reasons.Alexander Motchoulski - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):164-176.

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