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Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought insertion
Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):291 - 314 (2013)
Abstract
(2013). Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought insertion. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 291-314. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2011.625117Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Inner awareness: the argument from attention.Anna Giustina & Uriah Kriegel - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (9):2451–2475.
I Me Mine: on a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience.Marie Guillot - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-31.
Phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness.Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
What is it like to lack mineness? Depersonalization as a probe for the scope, nature and role of mineness.Alexandre Billon - 2023 - In M. Guillot & M. Garcia-Carpintero, Self-Experience: Essays on Inner Awareness. Oxford University Press. pp. 314-342.
Phenomenally Mine: In Search of the Subjective Character of Consciousness.Robert J. Howell & Brad Thompson - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):103-127.
References found in this work
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (2nd edition).David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Meditations on First Philosophy.René Descartes - 1641/1984 - Ann Arbor: Caravan Books. Edited by Stanley Tweyman.
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