Dialogue 41 (01):27-44 (2002)
Akrasia is both an intentional and an irrational phenomenon. These two characteristics can be reconciled by a careful reconstruction of practical reasoning. I undertake this task along Davidsonian lines, arguing against his critics that the notion of unconditional judgment is the key to an adequate account of akrasia. Unless akrasia is conceived as a failure of the agent to form an unconditional judgment that conforms to her best judgment "all things considered," the intentionality of akrasia is lost. Likewise, I show how practical and theoretical reasoning concur in the production of action, and why akrasia is a problem for the philosophy of action before being a problem for moral philosophy.
|Keywords||Weakness of Will Intentionality Unconditional Judgment Practical Reasoning Davidson|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science.Carl Hempel - 1965 - The Free Press.
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