Dialogue 41 (1):27-44 (2002)

Authors
Renée Bilodeau
Université Laval
Abstract
Akrasia is both an intentional and an irrational phenomenon. These two characteristics can be reconciled by a careful reconstruction of practical reasoning. I undertake this task along Davidsonian lines, arguing against his critics that the notion of unconditional judgment is the key to an adequate account of akrasia. Unless akrasia is conceived as a failure of the agent to form an unconditional judgment that conforms to her best judgment "all things considered," the intentionality of akrasia is lost. Likewise, I show how practical and theoretical reasoning concur in the production of action, and why akrasia is a problem for the philosophy of action before being a problem for moral philosophy.
Keywords Weakness of Will  Intentionality  Unconditional Judgment  Practical Reasoning  Davidson
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ISBN(s) 0012-2173
DOI 10.1017/s0012217300013585
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The Moral Problem.James Lenman - 1994 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):125-126.
Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]University of Chicago Press.

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